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NOTE
OFFENSES AGAINST THE CITY
T HE following statements are excerpts from three Minnesota
cases:
"It has repeatedly been decided by this court, as it has
elsewhere, that municipal ordinances are not criminal stat-
utes; that violations thereof are not crimes, nor are such
violations governed by the rules of the criminal law, save in
certain specified exceptional particulars."'
"The violation of an ordinance is properly punishable
under our Constitution by fine or by imprisonment, and is
a crime."-"
"This being a quasi criminal prosecution under an ordi-
nance, sections 8462 and 8463, G. S. 1913, are not applicable." 3
Perhaps it is misleading to take these statements out of their con-
1. State v. Robitshek, 60 Minn. 123, 124, 61 N. W. 1023 (1895).
2. State v. McDonald, 121 Minn. 207, 212, 141 N. W. 110, 112 (1913).
3. State v. Nelson, 157 Minn. 506, 507, 196 N. W. 279 (1923). Similar
statements recur throughout the reports. "Offenses against ordinances . . .
are not generally construed to be criminal cases, in the proper sense of the
term 'criminal,' and the prosecutions therefore are not 'criminal prosecutions'
within the meaning of the constitution, which refers to prosecutions for
offenses essentially criminal under the general laws of the state." City of
Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62, 64, 30 N. W. 305, 306 (1886). "Violations
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text, but they do serve to illustrate the extremly fluid nature of
prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances. Rather than
to rationalize this conflicting language, it will be far more profitable
to go behind the language and attempt to answer why the conflict
exists.
Each year in Minnesota as elsewhere in the country the rela-
tive population of our cities has been increasing,4 resulting in an
ever-increasing need for the regulation of crime. To cope with this
situation the Minnesota legislature, rather than attempting to deal
with the problem on a state level, has superimposed a local system
of regulation, courts, and enforcement in our cities and villages, at
least so far as minor offenses are concerned. This process has not
been of a general revisory nature but rather a kind of patching
and tacking technique. The pawer of the cities to regulate by the
enactment of ordinances was gradually increased by successive
amendments to the cities' charters leading eventually to a con-
stitutional amendment permitting "home rule." 5 The municipal
police forces, especially in the larger cities, grew from a small con-
tingent to a large and efficient enforcement agency with a personnel
of several hundred officers." Municipal courts were early established
of municipal ordinances are criminal offenses and trial therefor criminal
proceedings, within the meaning of the statutes now in question." Village of
Crosby v. Stemich, 160 Minn. 261, 262, 199 N. W. 918, 919 (1924). "A
prosecution for violation of a municipal ordinance such as this is not a crim-
inal proceeding. It is only quasi criminal, and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is not required." St. Paul v. Keeley, 194 Minn. 386, 388, 260 N. W.
357, 358 (1935). Surprisingly, the Minnesota court has not adopted its
recent practice resorted to in certain other areas, and designated such prose-
cutions sui generis. See Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232
Minn. 394, 396, 45 N. XV. 2d 549, 550 (1951), 35 Minn. L. Rev. 512 (status
of a fireman upon entering the premises of another in response to a call of
duty) ; In re E. C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 212, 45 N. W. 2d 388, 392
(1950), Note, 35 Minn. L. Rev. 564 (1951) (corporate director's relation
to the corporation) ; In re Rerat. 224 Minn. 124, 28 N. W. 2d 168 (1947)
(action for discipline of attorney) ; Reed v. Bjornson, 191 Minn. 254, 260,
253 N. W. 102, 105 (1934), Note, 18 Minn. L. Rev. 58.2 (tax on income
derived from real property).
4. The following figures from I Sixteenth Census of the United States
535 (1940) indicates the relative urban growth in Minnesota:




5. Minn. Const. Art. IV, § 36. The amendment was adopted Nov. 3, 1896,
and subsequently amended Nov. 8, 1898, and Nov. 3, 1942. For a discussion
of the Minnesota "Home Rule" amendment, see Anderson. Municipal Home
Rule in Minnesota, 7 Minn. L. Rev. 306 (1923) ; Dawley, Special Legislation
and Municipal Home Rule in Minnesota: Recent Developments, 16 Minn.
L. Rev. 659, 672 (1932).
6. For a brief discussion of the composition of law enforcement agencies
in Minnesota in 1937, see Regent's -Examining Committee on the Police
Training Project, Survey of Police Training, Section IV (1937).
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by special statutes for the larger cities,7 and at the turn of the
century general statutes were enacted to permit the establishment
of municipal courts where desired in all cities and villages not then
provided for.8
The court, of course, has not been unaware of this development
and it has recognized the need for a procedure particularly adapted
to the prosecution of violations of municipal ordinances. However,
it has tended to base its decisions as to the nature of such prosecu-
tions upon whether they are "civil" or "criminal." 9 These terms,
it shall be seen, do not provide a proper basis for classification.
Their use leads only to confusion and contradiction and requires
either that the court oscillate from one view to the other depend-
ing upon the particular issue before it or resort to terms such as
"quasi criminal" or "quasi civil."'1
What then determines the nature of the prosecution of violators
of municipal ordinances? While recognizing the danger of over-
simplification, it appears that the two determining factors are (a)
protection of the defendant, and (b) expediency. This is not the
place for a discussion of the need or appropriateness of a revision
in our concept of sanctions to be imposed for petty offenses under
statute or ordinance."' It is sufficient to note that one who violates
a municipal ordinance in Minnesota is generally subject to an im-
prisonment for a period up to 90 days or a fine of $100, or both.' 2
It is hardly necessary to point out that this penalty should be in-
7. The Minneapolis Municipal Court was established by Minn. Sp.
Laws 1874, c. 141; St. Paul Municipal Court, Minn. Sp. Laws 1875, c. 2;
Stillwater Municipal Court, Minn. Sp. Laws 1876 c. 200.
8. See Minn. Laws 1895, c. 229 (set out, as amended, in a note follow-
ing 27 M.S.A. § 488.26 (1947); Minn. Rev. Laws 1905, §§ 124-146 (as
amended, now being Minn. Stat. c. 488 (1949).
9. Historically in England violators of ordinances were subject to fine,
the proceedings being a civil action in debt or assumpsit, the former on the
theory of what might be termed liquidated damages, the latter on the theory
of an implied promise to perform a duty. 9 McQuillin, Municipal Corpora-
tions § 27.05 (3d ed. 1950). The text writers generally have divided the
states in this country into two groups. It is said that the majority of the
states follow the old English view and regard such prosecutions as civil, the
minority view being that they are criminal actions. 9 McQuillin, mtpra§ 27.06.
10. Speaking of the use of the terms "criminal" and "civil," one writer
has pointed out that their use "... is doubly handy in that the court can
stress either the civil or the criminal aspect, depending upon the desired con-
clusion." Grant, Penal Ordinances in California, 24 Calif. L. Rev. 123, 124
(1936). See 13 U. of Kan. City L. Rev. 160 (1944-45).
11. See Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: II, 43 Col.
L. Rev. 967 (1943); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col. L. Rev. 55
(1933) ; Notes, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 462 (1922), 12 Iowa L. Rev. 407 (1927)
[1946 Wis. L. Rev. 172; 12 Wis. L. Rev. 365 (1937).
12. See, for example, Charter of Minneapolis, c. 4, § 6.
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yoked only with great caution. On the other hand regard must be
had for the large number of petty offenses before the municipal
courts. Unfortunately adequate figures of the number of such
prosecutions in Minnesota are unavailable,", but little imagination
is needed to envision the complete breakdown of the system which
would result if the same procedure used in the prosecution of a
felony were followed in such cases. Thus, it is primarily a balancing
of these two factors which should determine the nature of the
prosecution of a violator of a municipal ordinance. If read with these
considerations in mind, the decisions of the Minnesota court on
this subject become less incongruous.
I. RELATIONSHIP TO STATUTES
A. Concurrent Jurisdiction
City charters in Minnesota generally give the municipality
power to pass ordinances and invoke penalties within their pre-
scribed spheres so long as they are "not repugnant to the laws of
Minnesota."' 4 An ordinance does not suspend the operation within
the city of a statute making precisely the same act a crime;"r nor
are the two necessarily repu-nant. 8 The ordinance will be set
aside only where the statute expressly pre-empts regulation'- or
the ordinance by implication "conflicts" with the statute. It is
beyond the scope of this Note to discuss "conflicts" between sub-
stantive provisions of ordinances and statutes,' 8 but generally it may
be said that Minnesota stands among those states which take a
13. In 1948 and 1949 there were 8885 and 9475 cases, respectively, be-
fore the Municipal Court of Rochester, Minnesota. Annual Reports of the
Municipal Courts and Conciliation Court of Rochester, Minnesota (1948,
1949). In 1946 the Municipal Court of Mankato, Minnesota, disposed of
1173 cases involving violations of municipal ordinances other than parking
violations. Talbott, Intergovernmental Relations and the Courts, Research
Monograph # 1, p. 60, Table 16 (1950). This is to be compared with
1179 criminal cases disposed of by all the district courts of Minnesota dur-
ing the same year. Id. at 43.
14. See Minneapolis City Charter, c. 4, § 5.
15. State v. Oleson, 26 Minn. 507, 5 N. V. 959 (1880) ; State v. Charles,
16 Minn. 474 (426) (1871).
16. City of Alexandria v. Viering, 177 Minn. 617, 225 N. W. 286 (1929)
(liquor ordinance making it a violation if there is a violation of the state or
federal prohibition acts held valid) ; City of Virginia v. Erickson, 141 Minn.
21, 168 N. W. 821 (1918) ; State v. Lindquist, 77 'Minn. 540, 80 N. 11V. 701
(1899) ; State v. Harris, 50 Min. 128, 52 N. W. 387 (1892).
17. See Minn. Laws 1911, c. 365, § 18, State v. 'Mandehr, 168 Minn.
139, 209 N. W. 750 (1926) ; later repealed by Minn. Laws 1927, c. 412, § 32.
18. For a discussion of the.problems which may arise, see Hitchcock,
Ohio Ordinances in Conflict with General Laws, 16 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 1
(1942) ; Grant, Municipal Ordinaices Supplenienting Criminal Laws, 9 So.
Calif. L. Rev. 95 (1936).
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"liberal" ' view and any ordinance will be held valid if it does not
lower the standard set out by the statute.20 The fact that the ordi-
nance and the statute prescribe different penalties does not con-
.stitute such a "conflict" as to make the ordinance void.2 1
B. Double Jeopardy
Assuming that there is a valid ordinance, not in conflict with
the statute, the question immediately posed is whether one may
be convicted under both the statute and the ordinance. The con-
stitution provides, ". . . no person for the same offense shall be put
twice in jeopardy of punishment .... -22 The issue was decided
in Minnesota in two early decisions involving identical facts. In
both, the defendant had previously been convicted of keeping a
house of ill fame contrary to a St. Paul ordinance and was subse-
quently prosecuted in the district court for a statutory felony based
upon the same act. In the first case, State v. Oleson, 23 the convic-
tion under the statute was affirmed despite Chief Justice Gilfillan's
opinion that since the ordinance existed only by virtue of the power
granted by the state, it was not different from an attempted prose-
cution under two identical statutes, the second being barred by
the first. Justice Berry agreed that prosecutions by both the city and
the state would be unconstitutional, but affirmed the conviction on
the ground that the ordinance was void and therefore the prior
conviction under it could not be a bar to a subsequent prosecution
by the state. Only Justice Cornell, whose view represents the law
in Minnesota today,2 1 took the position that a prior conviction
under the ordinance was not a bar to a subsequent prosecution
under a statute. He based his conclusion upon the theory that the
term "offense" as used in the constitution has reference both to the
act done and the law which it violated. He reasoned that since both
19. Note, 38 J. Grim. L. & Criminology 40 (1947).
20. Duluth v. Evans, 158 Minn. 450, 197 N. W. 737 (1924) ; State v.
Duluth, 134 Minn. 355, 159 N. W. 792 (1916); Evans v. Redwood Falls,
103 Minn. 314, 115 N. W. 200 (1908). One writer strongly disapproves of
"conflict" tests based upon whether "one law grants authority to do an act
Xl\hich the other law forbids" as not being reflective of the cases and suggests
that the following rule would serve as a more accurate basis for prediction:
"if the ordinance is the more efficient regulatory measure, no 'conflict' is
found; whereas, if the statute is more likely to function effectively, a 'con-
flict' will be declared to exist." Comment, 40 Yale L. J. 647, 651 (1931).
21. State v. Weeks, 216 Minn. 279, 12 N. W. 2d 493 (1943) ; City of
Jordan v. Nicolin, 84 Minn. 367, 87 N. W. 916 (1901) ; State v. Ludwig, 21
Minn. 202 (1875).
22. Minn. Const. Art. I, § 7.
23. 26 Minn. 507, 5 N. V. 959 (1880).
24. See State v. Cavett, 171 Minn. 505, 214 N_ W. 479 (1927).
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the city and the state had power to forbid such an act, the act was a
violation of the law of each and constituted two separate and distinct
"offenses." He likened it to the dual jurisdiction existing under
state and federal laws, whereby the defendant may be punished
by both for the same act. In the second case, State v. Lee,2t the
majority of the court accepted the position advanced by Justice
Cornell in the Oleson case and that view has never subsequently
been disputed by the Minnesota court.
Though widely accepted throughout the United States,20 the
logic -used-or-feach'such a result is both-unsound and unjust. The
analogy to successive state and federal prosecutions is very weak.
These two governments are, in a sense, independent sovereigns,
neither being the agent of the other, and it is generally agreed. that
the double jeopardy provisions of the state and federal constitutions
do not apply.2 7 The city, on the other hand, is clearly the creature
of the state and exercises delegated powers."' It is clear that the
state could not prosecute the defendant twice directly and it is
difficult to perceive under what theory the state can do indirectly
through its agent what it cannot do directly.29 A much more accu-
rate analogy than the one drawn by the Minnesota court is pre-
sented in the case of Grafton v. United States,3 0 where it was held
that a prosecution by general court-martial pursuant to the Articles
25. 29 Minn. 445, 13 N. W. 913 (1882). The case was a 3-2 decision.
Justice Berry took the opposite view from the one he took in the Oleson case
and joined with Justices Vanderburgh and Mitchell in affirming the convic-
tion. Chief Justice Gilfillan and Justice Dickenson dissented.
26. See discussion and cases cited in Kneier, Prosecutiorn Under State
Law and Municipal Ordinance a Double Jeopardy, 16 Cornell L. Q. 201
(1931) ; 10 Minn. L. Rev. 621 (1926) ; for a collection of early cases, see
Note, 92 Am. St. Rep. 89, 100 (1902).
27. United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377 (1922); United States v.
Ratagczak, 275 Fed. 558 (N.D. Ohio 1921) ; Hall v. Commonwealth, 197
Ky. 179, 246 S. W. 441 (1923); see Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 19-20
(U.S. 1852) ; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 434 (U.S. 1847) ; Martin v. United
States, 271 Fed. 685, 686 (8th Cir. 1921); People v. Superintendent of
Women's Prison, 282 N. Y. 115, 118, 25 N. E. 2d 869, 871 (1940) ; State v.
Frach, 162 Ore. 602, 605, 94 P. 2. 143, 145 (1939). Even the view that both
the State and Federal Governments may punish the defendant for the same
act has not gone without criticism. See Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive
Prosecutions, 32 Col. L. Rev. 1309 (1932).
28. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 187 (1923); see
Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Ry., 196 U. S. 539, 548 (1905) ;
Associated Schools v. School District, 122 Minn. 254, 257, 142 N. V. 325,
326 (1913) ; State v. Simmons, 32 Minn. 540, 542, 21 N. W. 750, 751 (1884);
Crane, Double Jeopardy and Courts-Martial, 3 Minn. L. Rev. 181, 183 (1919)
McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government, 16
Col. L. Rev. 190, 299 (1916).
29. Notes, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 522, 541-543 (1940), 31 Col. L. Rev. 291,
296 (1931) ; see State v. West, 42 Minn. 147, 152, 43 N. W. 845, 847 (1889).
30. 206 U. S. 333 (1907).
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of War of the United States was a bar to a subseqfient prosecution
by the Philippine Islands based upon the same acts because "the
Government of the Philippines owes its existence wholly to the
United States and its judicial tribunals exert all their powers by
authority of the United States."3' 1
The majority in the Lee case also pointed out that in England
municipal ordinances were enforced by a civil action 32 and the
mere fact that we have clothed such an action with a criminal pro-
cedure does not change its essential nature. 8 In a later action turn-
ing upon the question whether a prosecution for the violation of
an ordinance was a civil or criminal action, the court said, however,
that the Lee case did not decide that such an action was civil, but
merely that the same act might be an offense against both the city
and the state, and a prosecution for the one did not bar a prosecu-
tion for the other.3 4 Consistently with this later case, the Minne-
sota court has held that an appeal by the city constitutes double
jeopardy.3 ' Had the court followed its earlier interpretation an-
nounced in the Lee case, the logical result would be that the city
could appeal, for either party may appeal in a civil action.
It is certainly true, as pointed out by Justice Cornell in the
Oleson case, that the municipality has a very substantial interest
in the prosecution of those who would offend the peace and morals
of the community." It is equally true that unless such prosecutions
31. Id. at 354. Minn. Stat. § 610.23 (1949) makes a prior conviction or
acquittal for the same act by another state or country a defense to a sub-
sequent prosecution in Minnesota. It would seem that even if the same act
violating both an ordinance and a statute is properly treated as an offense
against two distinct sovereignties for purposes of double jeopardy, this ex-
pression of legislative policy should be applicable and the second prosecution
barred. See Grant, supra note 10, at 133-134.
32. See note 9 supra.
33. State v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445, 452, 460, 13 N. W. 913, 915, 918 (1871).
For cases in other jurisdictions where the court has advanced such an argu-
ment to avoid the prohibition against double jeopardy, see Kneier, supra note
26, at 204-206.
34. See State v. West, 42 Minn. 147, 150, 43 N. W. 845, 846 (1889).
It has been suggested that ". . . the doctrine that the same set of facts may
sustain both a civil and a criminal action tended to lend support to successive
municipal and state prosecutions until the 'dual offense' theory was sufficiently
well established to stand on its own feet." Grant, Penal Ordinances and the
Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy, 25 Geo. L. J. 293, 296 (1937).
35. St. Paul v. Stamm, 106 Minn. 81, 118 N. W. 154 (1908) ; 12 N. Y.
U. L. Q. Rev. 308 (1934). This is consistent with the very conservative view
taken by the Minnesota court on the matter of appeals by the prosecution. See
34 Minn. L. Rev. 344 (1950). This is not to be interpreted as indicating a
trend to regard prosecutions by the city as criminal in nature, since the
court has repeatedly held that evidence beyond a reasonable doubt is not re-
quired for conviction. State v. Sivoren, 215 Minn. 438, 10 N. W. 2d 353
(1943) ; State v. Jamieson, 211 finn. 262, 300 N. W. 809 (1941) ; St. Paul
v. Keeley. 194 Minn. 386, 260 N. W. 357 (1935).
36. State v. Oleson, 26 Minn. 507, 515, 5 N. W. 959, 967 (1880).
1952] NOTE
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are carried out' by the municipality, offenders will often escape
punishment because the state lacks adequate machinery to deal
with the large number of petty offenses committeed in the city.
But it does not follow that the only alternative is to permit the
defendant to be twice punished for the same act. A more just
solution would be to hold that ". . . prosecutions may be insituted
under either law) and the court that first acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused has exclusive jurisdiction to hear, try,
and determine the case; and a conviction for an offense which is
the same in both laws will be a bar to a prosecution for the same
offense under the other law."--- To those who would argue that this
view would enable the defendant to secure a lesser punishment by
subjecting himself to the jurisdiction of the municipality where
the penalty under the statute is greater than under the ordinance,3-
the answer is that any attempt by the municipality to provide a
lesser penalty should be held repugnant to the laws of the state and
therefore void. Since the maximum penalty permitted for viola-
tions of municipal ordinances is that allowed for mere misde-
meanors, the net effect would be to remove from the jurisdiction of
the municipality all acts also constituting gross misdemeanors or
felonies under the statutes. The defendant would then be given
the opportunity of having a jury trial and would not be convicted
except by evidence establishing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
protections not accorded to a defendant prosecuted for the viola-
tion of an ordinance. Because of the seriousness of these offenses
and since their number is relatively small, there is no reason to
sacrifice these guaranties in o-der to secure expediency.
II. PRE-'TRIAL PROCEDURE
Municipal courts are organized in Minnesota pursuant to the
authority given to the legislature by Art. 6, § 1 of the constitu-
tion to establish such inferior courts as they shall from time to time
deem necessary. 0 Unfortunately, these courts lack uniformity of
practice and jurisdiction, though generally it may be said that
they have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of municipal ordi-
nances. 40 The rules of practice are governed by the municipal court
act under which they were organized. These courts may be classi-
37. People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 628, 42 N. W. 1124, 1130 (1889).
38. See State v. Oleson, 26 Minn. 507, 511, 5 N. W. 959, 963 (1880).
39. State v. Fleming, 112 Minn. 136, 127 N. W. 473 (1910).
40. See Minn. Stat. § 488.09 (1949).
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fled into three groups :-' (1) those organized and existing under
the Revised Laws of 1905, as amended, now Minn. Stat. c. 488
(1949) ; (2) those organized and existing under Minn. Laws 1895,
c. 229, as amended ;42 and (3) those organized and existing under
special laws, as from time to time amended.4 3 While any attempt
to discuss all of the problems peculiar to each of these acts would
prove impractical, there are some common to all or a majority of
them which may be profitably discussed.
Where the defendant is in custody and brought before the court
or clerk without process, several of the municipal court acts provide
that a brief statement of the offense with which the defendant is
charged entered upon the records of the court may serve as a sub-
.titute for a formal complaint. 44 The purpose of this abbreviated
form is to ". . . simplify the prosecution of minor offenses in the
municipal court, and to dispense with the necessity of technical
accuracy . . ." required in felonies and indictable crimes.45 Gen-
erally this may be said to reflect the attitude of the court even where
a formal complaint is used." Unless constitutional or substantive
rights of the defendant are infringed, mere inaccuracies in the
complaint will not be held reversible error.4 7 However, whether
the brief form or the formal complaint be used, the essential ele-
ments of the offense must be set out,48 and inaccuracies resulting
from mere laxity will be held jurisdictional.49
In City of Winona v. Burke"0 the court said that failure to
plead and prove a city ordinance was reversible error, as the court
does not take judicial notice of such ordinances.51 Five years later
41. For a classification by cities of the operating authority and the prac-
tice of the various municipal courts, see 27 M. S. A. pp. 314-316 (1947).
42. This chapter, as amended, is set out in full in a note following 27
M. S. A. § 488.26 (1947).
43. For the Municipal Court Acts for Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth,
.ce 27 M. S. A. c. 488, App. 1, 3, and 5 (1947), respectively.
44. 27 M. S. A. c. 488, App. 1, § 17 (1947) (Minneapolis), App. 3, § 35
(St. Paul), App. 5, § 33 (Duluth) ; see State v. La Due, 164 Minn. 499, 205
N. W. 450 (1925) ; State v. Olson, 115 Minn. 153, 131 N. W. 1084 (1911);
State v. Mkesolongitis, 74 Minn. 165, 77 N. W. 29 (1898).
45. State v. Olson, 115 Minn. 153, 155, 131 N.W. 1084, 1085 (1911). But
scc State v. Swanson, 106 Minn. 288, 119 N. W. 45 (1908).
46. See State v. Harder, 163 Minn. 47, 48, 203 N. W. 418 (1925).
47. State v. Siporen, 215 Minn. 438, 10 N. W. 2d 353 (1943); State v.
Wilson, 212 Minn. 380, 3 N. V. 2d 677 (1942).
48. State v. Tremont, 185 Minn. 101, 240 N. W. 118 (1931); State v.
Claire, 121 Minn. 521, 140 N. W. 747 (1913) ; State v. Bates, 96 Minn. 150,
104 N. W. 890 (1905).
49. State v. Covington, 171 Minn. 295, 213 N. W. 909 (1927) ; State v.
Harder, 163 Minn. 47, 203 N. W. 418 (1925).
50. 23 Minn. 254 (1876).
51. Dean Wigniore has suggested that such decisions are based upon
"technical quiddities." 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2572 (3d ed. 1940).
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the legislature modified this requirement52 and it is now sufficient
to plead an ordinance by reference, and the court of first instance
must take judicial notice of its provisions without proof.5 3 Whether
the supreme court as well is bound by these stautes has not been
decided. Certainly, to be required to take judicial notice, especially
of the ordinances of the smalle:r communities, is an extreme burden
on the supreme court.5 4 However, whether required by statute to
take notice or not, the court has indicated its intention to take
notice where the court below is required to do so. 5
III. THE RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JuRY
The Constitution of Minnesota provides in Article I, § 4, "The
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.. .,"56 and again in § 6
of the same Article, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury .... ,,57 However several of the municipal court acts provide that
prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances shall be dis-
posed of in a summary manner without a jury."' In upholding the
constitutionality of such provisions it was early established that
these prosecutions do not come within the constitutional guaranties,
but, as the court in one case pointed out, there is a real, or at least
an apparent, discrepancy as to the basis upon which the decisions
52. Minn. Laws 1881, Ex. Se,;s., c. 59.
53. See Minn. Stat. § 544.20 (1949) ("In pleading any ordinance of a
city or village ... it shall be sufficient to refer to the ordinance ... by its
title and the date of its approval . . .") ; Minn. Stat. § 412.861(2) (1949)("It shall be a sufficient pleading: of the ordinances or resolutions of the
village to refer to them by section and number or chapter."); Village of
Fairmont v. Meyer, 83 Minn. 456, 86 N. W. 457 (1901). In other cases, the
same result is reached by a similar provision in the city charter. See State v.
Overby, 116 Minn. 304, 133 N. W. 792 (1911) ; State v. Gill, 89 Minn. 502,
95 N. W. 449 (1903).
54. See 10 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 493 (1936).
55. See State v. Schoenig, 72 Minn. 528, 529, 75 N. W. 711, 712(1898); Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry., 69 Minn. 353, 357, 72 N. W.
713, 717 (1897).
56. The court indicated in an early case that this section applies only
to civil cases. See Whallon v. Bancroft, 4 Minn. 109 (70), 113 (74) (1860).
However, subsequent cases have considered both sections 4 and 6 in deciding
that there is no constitutional guaranty of trial by jury in prosecutions for
violations of municipal ordinances. State v. Parks, 199 Minn. 622, 273 N. W.
233 (1937) ; City of Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62, 30 N. W. 305 (1886).
57. The provision is similar to that found in Amendment VI of the
Constitution of the United States.
58. Minn. Stat. § 488.09 (1949) ; 27 M. S. A. c. 488, App. 1, § 7 (1947)(Minneapolis), App. 3, § 7 (St. Paul), App. 5, § 9 (Duluth) ; St. Paul v.
Robinson, 129 Minn. 383, 152 N. W. 777 (1915); State v. Marciniak, 97
Minn. 355, 105 N. W. 965 (1906) ; State v. Harris, 50 Minn. 128, 52 N. W.
387 (1892).
[Vol. 36:143
rest."' It is not an easy task to reconcile or even understand the
reasoning used by the court in the early cases. However, a brief
discussion of them in the light of the history of the guaranty of the
right of trial by jury may be of some aid.
At the time the Federal Constitution was adopted there existed
in England and in the Colonies a large class of "petty offenses"
which were triable without a jury.6 ° It is an accepted doctrine of
constitutional law, both state and federal, that the constitutional
guaranties of a jury trial merely preserve that right as it existed
at the time of the adoption of the constitution.6' Therefore, al-
though Article III, § 2, and Amendment VI of the Federal Con-
stitution are absolute in their terms, they exclude such "petty of-
fenses."116 2 Since these provisions of the Federal Constitution with
their judicial exception applied to territories as well,6 3 the defendant
in the territorial court in Minnesota had precisely these same rights
to a jury trial. 4 In addition to this federal guaranty, at the time
of the adoption of the Minnesota Constitution there existed a
territorial law guarantying the right of jury trial in all criminal
prosecutions under the state laws, regardless of the grade of the
offense.05 These, then, were the rights of jury trial incorporated into
sections 4 and 6 of Article I of the Minnesota Constitution.
In City of Mankato v. Arnold,66 one of the first cases applying
these provisions to the .question of summary procedure in the mu-
nicipal court, the court reasoned as follows: "Before the adoption
of the constitution, and generally in this country and in England
... the prevalent practice and rule was to dispense with jury trials
in municipal prosecutions for the violation of ordinances." 67 That
part of the constitutional guaranty existing by virtue of the incorpo-
59. See State v. Marciniak, supra note 57 at 360, 105 N. W. at 967.
60. 9 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 27.32 (3d ed. 1950). For a
very comprehensive discussion, see Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal
Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 Harv. L.
Rev. 917 (1926).
61. City of Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62, 30 N. W. 305 (1885) ; see
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 549 (1888); State v. West, 42 Minn. 147,
150, 43 N. W. 845, 846 (1889) ; 9 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 27.34(3d ed. 1950) ; Note, 24 Geo. L. J. 440 (1936).
62. Schick v. United States, 195 U. S. 65 (1904); Frankfurter and
Corcoran, supra note 60.
63. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (1898).
64. Thus, the court in State v. Marciniak, 97 Minn. 355, 360, 105 N. W.
965, 967 (1906) was not technically accurate in saying that Amendment VI of
the Federal Constitution was not relevant. Though the provision cannot be
asserted in a case before the state court, its substance is incorporated into
the guaranties of the Minnesota Constitution.
65. See State v. West, 42 Minn, 147, 151, 43 N. W. 845, 847 (1889).
66. 36 Minn. 62, 30 N. W. 305 (1886).
67. Id. at 64, 30 N. W. at 306.
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ration of the territorial law guarantying the right of jury trial in
all criminal prosecutions under state laws does not afford the de-
fendant any additional right because prosecutions for violations
of municipal ordinances are not criminal prosecutions. In a sub-
sequent case 8 involving the jurisdiction of the Minneapolis Mu-
nicipal Court, the court stressed the criminal nature of such prose-
cutions and revised the reasoning used in the Arnold case, pointing
out that the court did not actually mean that such prosecutions were
not criminal, but that the territorial law incorporated into the con-
stitution did not refer to prosecutions under ordinances but only
to those cases where by statute the act is made an offense against
the peace and dignity of the state. This, of course, brings forth the
same question previously discussed in the problem of double jeop-
ardy, i.e., are ordinances any less state laws because they are enacted
by municipal councils pursuant to authority granted by the state
than are statutes enacted by the legislature? Whether the reasoning
is basically sound or ficticious is almost academic. The result is
firmly established"8 and not likely to be changed, for, as the court
in the Arnold case pointed out, "Prosecutions for offenses against
municipal by-laws ...must necessarily be summary to be effec-
tive. . . .,,7 Assuming that the right to a trial by jury should be pre-
served wherever possible, that right must nonetheless yield to
practicalities.
68. State v. West, 42 Minn. 147, 43 N. W. 845 (1889); see also City
of Madison v. Martin, 109 Minn. 292, 123 N. W. 809 (1909).
69. State v. Hope, 212 Minn. 319, 3 N. W. 2d 499 (1942) ; State v.
Broms, 139 Minn. 402, 166 N. W. 771 (1918); St. Paul v. Robinson, 129
Minn. 383, 152 N. W. 777 (1915); State v. Collins, 107 Minn. 500, 120
N. W. 1081 (1909) ; State v. Grimes, 83 Minn. 460, 86 N. W. 449 (1901) ;
State v. Harris, 50 Minn. 128, 52 N. W. 387 (1892). It is immaterial that the
same act might also constitute a misdemeanor under a statute under which
the defendant would be entitled to a jury trial, State v. Parks, 199 Minn. 622,
273 N. W. 233 (1937). The court has even applied the rule where the same
act is made an indictable offense under the statute. State v. Anderson, 165
Minn. 150, 206 N. W. 51 (1925). For a brief summary of the variety of re-
sults reached in other jurisdictions, see 2 Okla. L. Rev. 80 (1949).
70. City of Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62, 65, 30 N. W. 305, 307(1886). In Hill v. Dalton, 72 Ga. 314 (1884), after finding that there was no
constitutional right to a jury trial, the court made the following observation:
"It is well that such is the law, the constitutional law; for if no man could
be fined or imprisoned for violaticn of city police ordinances, except by jury
trial on indictment, away would go all power in our municipal authorities
to preserve peace and good order within their corporate powers." Id. at 319.
One writer noted, "They [the courts] are moved, on the one hand, by con-
siderations of the expediency of summary procedure, and on the other by its
dangers as a denial of a right inherent in our system of law." Note, 24 Geo.
L. J. 440, 447 (1936).
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